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Abstract. We design approximate weakly group strategy-proof mecha-
nisms for resource reallocation problems using Milgrom and Segal’s de-
ferred acceptance auction framework: the radio spectrum and network
bandwidth reallocation problems in the procurement auction setting and
the cost minimization problem with set cover constraints in the sell-
ing auction setting. Our deferred acceptance auctions are derived from
simple greedy algorithms for the underlying optimization problems and
guarantee approximately optimal social welfare (cost) of the agents re-
taining their rights (contracts). In the reallocation problems, we design
procurement auctions to purchase agents’ broadcast/access rights to free
up some of the resources such that the unpurchased rights can still be
exercised with respect to the remaining resources. In the cost minimiza-
tion problem, we design a selling auction to sell early termination rights
to agents with existing contracts such that some minimal constraints are
still satisfied with remaining contracts. In these problems, while the “al-
located” agents transact, exchanging rights and payments, the objective
and feasibility constraints are on the “rejected” agents.
1 Introduction
Motivated by the US government’s effort to reallocate channels currently allo-
cated for television broadcasting for wireless broadband services, Milgrom and
Segal [9] introduced a class of mechanisms called deferred acceptance (DA) auc-
tions for resource reallocation problems. DA auctions greedily choose an alloca-
tion by iteratively rejecting the least attractive bid determined by some scoring
functions and can be implemented with adaptive reverse greedy algorithms. Mil-
grom and Segal showed that DA auctions satisfy several important properties:
they are strategyproof, weakly group (WG) strategy-proof, can be implemented
using ascending clock auctions, and lead to the same outcomes as the complete-
information Nash equilibria of corresponding paid-as-bid auctions.
Subsequently, Du¨tting et al. [3] studied the strengths and limitations of DA
auctions with respect to achievable approximation guarantees on social welfare
in two selling auction design problems. For the knapsack auction problem, they
showed a separation between approximation guarantees by DA auctions and by
⋆ Supported in part by an NSF Graduate Research Fellowship.
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more general strategyproof mechanisms. For the combinatorial auction prob-
lem with single-minded bidders, they designed an O(d)-approximate DA auc-
tion when bidders’ desired bundles’ sizes are at most d and an O(
√
m logm)-
approximate DA auction where m is the number of items. In a different work,
Du¨tting et al. [4] studied double auctions for settings in which unit-demand
buyers and unit-supply sellers must be matched one-to-one subject to certain
constraints. In particular, they showed WG-strategy-proof DA double auctions
can be designed by composing two greedy algorithms, one for each side, that use
DA rules.
In this paper, we further develop connections between DA auctions and
greedy algorithms in the context of the resource reallocation problems that mo-
tivated Milgrom and Segal [9]’s DA auction framework. More specifically, we
show that several simple greedy approximation algorithms lead to DA auctions
with the same approximation guarantees. We consider welfare maximization in
the radio spectrum and network bandwidth reallocation problems and the cost
minimization problem with set cover constraints.
In the radio spectrum reallocation problem, we (the government) want to
reallocate channels currently allocated for television broadcasting for wireless
broadband services, effectively reducing the number of channels available for
broadcasting, by buying the television stations’ broadcasting rights. The real-
location process involves purchasing some of the rights and reassigning the re-
maining stations with rights into a smaller set of channels; the cleared spectrum
will, then, be used for wireless broadband services. The reassignment should be
accomplished in a way that respects constraints stipulating that two interfer-
ing neighboring stations are not assigned to the same channel. Assuming the
stations bid their values of keeping broadcast rights, we want to maximize the
social welfare of the stations to keep their rights.
Similarly, in the network bandwidth reallocation problem, we (the network
operator) want to reallocate some network connections currently in use for other
purposes. We want to buy access rights of some firms using the network such that
the demands of firms still with their rights can be served in a smaller network,
with the goal of maximizing the social welfare of these latter firms.
In addition, we consider the cost minimization problem with set cover con-
straints in the selling auction setting. The bidders are looking to terminate their
contracts, by paying penalties if necessary, and we (the government) want to
agree to such requests while ensuring that some minimal constraints, modeled
by the well-known set cover problem, are satisfied. We sell early termination
rights to these bidders with the goal of minimizing the social cost, i.e., the total
bid value, of those bidders whose requests are not honored.
Our Contributions Using Milgrom and Segal [9]’s DA auction framework, we
design approximate DA auctions for reallocation problems, in which the “al-
located” agents transact, exchanging rights and payments, while the objective
and feasibility constraints are on the “rejected” agents. We show simple forward
greedy algorithms, not the reverse kind, are sufficient to derive DA auctions that
guarantee approximately optimal social welfare (cost) of agents to retain their
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rights (contracts). Our DA auctions are computationally efficient and can be
computable in polynomial time. More interestingly, the scoring functions of the
auctions are algorithmic in nature and might not be expressible in a closed form;
they use helper variables to track the progress of allocation.
In the radio spectrum reallocation problem, we design DA auctions that
are approximately optimal for certain interference graphs: interval graphs, disk
graphs, and bounded degree-d graphs. Unlike the near-optimality result in [9]
that relies on the existence of a non-trivial partitioning scheme, our approxima-
tion ratios depend solely on simple graph parameters. Disk graphs, in particular,
are a natural modeling representation of the interference graphs of the stations’
circular broadcast ranges. For the network bandwidth reallocation problem, we
design an approximate DA auction with scoring functions derived from a result
due to Briest et al. [2]. For the cost minimization problem with set cover con-
straints, we show that a well-known primal-dual greedy approximation algorithm
can be implemented by a DA auction.
Future Work It would be interesting to investigate whether or not we can further
improve the results in this paper. For instance, in the radio spectrum reallocation
problem, a better performing DA auction with more complex scoring functions
might be possible on different kinds of interference graphs. More generally, it
would be interesting to have black box results formalizing the conditions under
which greedy algorithms can be implemented as DA auctions and comparison-
type results comparing DA auctions to other kinds of auctions with different
incentive properties in terms of social welfare/cost.
Other Related Work Mechanisms derived from greedy algorithms have been
studied previously for other various mechanism design problems, but not within
the DA auction framework and without consideration of WG strategy-proofness.
We refer to these work and the references therein: Lehmann et al. [6], Borodin
and Lucier [7, 1], and Briest at al. [2].
2 Preliminaries
We consider procurement auctions in the resource reallocation problems; the
setting for selling auctions in the cost minimization problem is equivalent but
inverted.
LetN be the set of bidders. Each bidder submits a bid and the auction decides
on the allocation and payments such that the bidders either “win” or “lose”, i.e.,
his bid to supply an item is accepted or not, and only the winning bidders receive
payments. We assume that bids b = (b1, . . . , b|N |) are from the bid profile space
B = B1 × · · · ×B|N |, and that each bidder i’s value vi is in the range [0, v¯i] and
his bid bi is restricted to a finite set Bi such that max Bi > v¯i.
1 A procurement
auction has allocation rule a : B → 2N and payment rule p : B → R|N | such that
pi(b) = 0 for i ∈ N \ a(b). In settings we consider, there will be constraints on
1 The restriction of finite bid spaces can be removed.
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Algorithm 1 DA Auction with Scoring Functions {sAi }A⊆N,i∈A
1: Accept bids b1, . . . , b|N|
2: A = N
3: while ∃i ∈ A : sAi (bi, bN\A) > 0 do
4: i = argmaxi∈A s
A
i (bi, bN\A)
5: A = A \ {i}
6: end while
7: return A
the possible allocations allowed. Note each bidder is a strategic agent that seeks
to maximize his utility (or payoff) which is pi(b)−vi if he wins, and 0 otherwise.
We define important properties of auctions: An auction is strategy-proof if
for every bidder i, vi ∈ [0, v¯i], and other bids b−i ∈ B−i, it is optimal for the
bidder to truthfully bid his value v+i := min{bi ∈ Bi : bi > vi}. An auction is
weakly group (WG) strategy-proof if for every profile of values v, a set of bidders
S ⊆ N , and coordinated false bids by these deviating bidders, there exists at
least one bidder in S who does not get a strictly better payoff than under truthful
reporting. An auction is α-approximate if it achieves at least the α fraction of
the optimal welfare in all problem instances (α < 1).
In reallocation problems, we want to design a procurement auction to pur-
chase agents’ broadcast/access rights to free up some of the resources such that
the unpurchased rights can still be exercised with respect to the remaining re-
sources. Agents report their private values of rights and receive payments when
their rights are purchased. Our objective is to maximize the social welfare of
agents retaining their rights. Note that the “allocated” agents transact, exchang-
ing rights and payments, but the objective and feasibility constraints are on the
“rejected” agents in these auctions.2
Deferred Acceptance Auctions Deferred acceptance (DA) auctions are auctions
in which the allocation is determined by an iterative process of rejecting bid-
ders one by one from the whole set. Milgrom and Segal [9] showed they satisfy
strong incentive guarantees such as strategy-proofness, WG-strategy-proofness,
and other useful implementation properties. Note the well-studied Vickrey auc-
tion is known to be not WG-strategy-proof.
DA auctions can be described as reverse greedy algorithms that use certain
scoring functions {sAi }A⊆N,i∈A as shown in Algorithm 1. Bidders are removed
from A one at a time until termination of the while-loop and the resultingA is the
allocation. Note the scoring functions sAi : Bi ×BN\A → R+ are nondecreasing
in the first argument. The bidder i’s score during an iteration with the current
set of active bidders A is dependent on its own bid bi and bids of those inactive
bidders in N \A, but not on the bids of other active bidders. For the allocation
2 In more common auction settings, the objective and feasibility constraints are on
the “allocated” agents.
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rule a determined by Algorithm 1, the corresponding payment rule p is defined:
pi(b−i) = max{b′i ∈ Bi : i ∈ a(b′i, b−i)} , (1)
i.e., the winning bidder i’s payment is the maximum bid value with which he
remains allocated. For more details, see [9].
We study greedy algorithms with allocation rules implementable by DA auc-
tions. These algorithms include the standard greedy-by-weight algorithms that
process elements in order of decreasing weight and several primal-dual greedy al-
gorithms that utilize variables from the linear programming formulations of the
underlying problems. In this paper, we are primarily interested in the greedy
algorithms of the “single pass” nature, i.e., those that start with an empty (and
feasible) solution and iteratively augment it without any post-processing steps
that might undo some part of the solution.
We formalize a notion to capture which greedy algorithms can be imple-
mented as DA auctions. Note we have an analogous definition for reverse greedy
algorithms that instead return A as the final solution3, but the following version
for forward greedy algorithms is sufficient for the reallocation problems:
Definition 1. Let N be the element set and w : N → R+ be a weight function. A
greedy algorithm ALG is DA-implementable if it can be implemented with active
set A which is initialized to N and scoring functions sAi : Bi ×BN\A → R+ for
each A ⊆ N, i ∈ A such that:
1. In each iteration, element i to be selected and removed from A is the highest
scoring element argmaxi∈A s
A
i (wi, wN\A);
2. When sAi (wi, wN\A) = 0 for all i ∈ A, ALG terminates and returns N \A.
Notations We use the common notation −i to denote the bidders other than
bidder i. We use x(i) and xi interchangeably to indicate the i-th component
value (representing the i-th bidder, the i-th edge, etc.) for any vector variable x.
Without loss of generality, we assume argmax and argmin operators return the
lowest indexed argument according to a consistent global order in the case of a
tie.
3 Radio Spectrum Reallocation
We design a simple DA auction that achieves near-optimal social welfare for cer-
tain classes of interference graphs in the spectrum reallocation problem. Without
relying on the assumption of a partitioning scheme in Milgrom and Segal [9], we
show that our DA auction achieves an approximation ratio dependent only on
simple structural parameters of the interference graphs.4 For our analysis, we
3 This is for the more common auction setting described in Footnote 2.
4 Milgrom and Segal’s result assumes the existence of a ordered partition of N into m
disjoint setsN1, . . . , Nm such that: (1) the edge (i, j) exists for each i, j ∈ Nk, 1 ≤ k ≤
m; and (2) there exists some d < n such that |S|+|∩i∈S∪l<k{j ∈ Nl : (i, j) ∈ E}| ≤ n
for each 1 ≤ k ≤ m and S ⊆ Nk with |S| ≤ n− d.
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Algorithm 2Greedy Algorithm for the MaxWeight k-colorable Subgraph Prob.
1: I1 = · · · = Ik = ∅
2: for v ∈ V in decreasing order of weight do
3: if ∃ i : Ii ∪ {v} remains independent then
4: i = min {i : Ii ∪ {v} remains independent}
5: Ii = Ii ∪ {v}
6: end if
7: end for
8: return
⋃
i Ii
proceed with a series of reductions from the spectrum reallocation problem to
the maximum weight k-colorable subgraph problem to the submodular function
maximization and maximum weight independent set problems.
The spectrum reallocation problem is as follows: Let G = (V,E) be the inter-
ference graph where V is the vertex set representing the television stations and
E is the edge set where there is an edge between two vertices if the corresponding
stations interfere were they to be assigned to the same channel; we use N and
V interchangeably. Let k be the number of channels available for reassignment.
Given stations’ bids b1, b2, . . ., we want to find a set A of stations to allocate,
or buy their broadcast rights, to maximize the welfare of those retaining their
rights such that the subgraph G(V \ A,E) induced by them is k-colorable, i.e.,
colorable with k colors. We interpret the bids to be the stations’ reported values
of retaining the broadcast rights.
We consider the following classes of G: interval graphs, disk graphs, and
bounded degree-d graphs. The interval graphs and disk graphs are intersection
graphs with a geometric representation; in interval (disk) graphs, the vertices
represent line-segments (disks) in a 1D-space (2D-space) and an edge exists
between two vertices if their corresponding representations intersect or even just
touch. In bounded degree-d graphs, the degree of every vertex is at most d.
3.1 Main Results
We reduce the spectrum reallocation problem to the NP-hard problem of finding
the maximum weight k-colorable subgraph of G: Given G(V,E), k and a weight
function w : V → R+, we want to find the maximum weight subgraph V ′ ⊂ V
such that G(V ′, E) is k-colorable. As the weight function is derived from the bids
b1, b2, . . ., we have the same objective in both problems. In particular, if there
is a DA-implementable approximate greedy algorithm for the maximum weight
k-colorable subgraph problem, we get a DA auction with the same performance
guarantee on social welfare for the spectrum reallocation problem.
In fact, Algorithm 2 is a DA-implementable greedy algorithm with good
approximation guarantees:
Theorem 1. Algorithm 2 is a DA-implementable (1 − e−1/α)-approximation
algorithm for the maximum weight k-colorable subgraph problem where α is 2+γ
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for interval graphs, (2 + γ)2 for disk graphs, and d for bounded degree-d graphs,
for γ = lmax/lmin, i.e., the ratio between the maximum and minimum lengths
(radii) for interval (disk) graphs.
Proof. (DA-implementability) Note that Algorithm 2 upon termination returns
a subgraph along with a valid k-coloring given by the independent sets I1, . . . , Ik.
We show its implementation with the active set and scoring functions as follows:
Let the active set A be the vertices not yet selected and I
N\A
1 , . . . , I
N\A
k be the
associated independent sets consisting of vertices in N \A. We define the scoring
functions:
sAv (wv, wN\A) =
{
w(v), if ∃i : IN\Ai ∪ {v} is independent
0, otherwise
. (2)
Note that each scoring function sAv is nondecreasing in the first argument,
and that the next element v to be greedily selected into N \A (and out of A) is
the highest scoring element argmaxv s
A
v .
(Approximation) We defer this part of the proof to Section 3.2.
Hence, our main result follows. In the special cases of the unit-interval and
unit-disk graphs (i.e., γ = 1), we get constant approximations:
Corollary 1. The DA auction with scoring functions (2) is a (1 − e−1/α)-
approximate WG-strategy-proof mechanism for the spectrum reallocation prob-
lem, where α is 2 + γ for interval graphs, (2 + γ)2 for disk graphs, and d for
bounded degree-d graphs; and γ = lmax/lmin.
3.2 Proof of Theorem 1 (Approximation)
We show that Algorithm 2 achieves the stated approximation ratios for the in-
terval graphs, disk graphs, and bounded degree-d graphs by analyzing a related
algorithm, Algorithm 3, which will be shown to be equivalent for a choice of
ALG. We further reduce the maximum weight k-colorable subgraph problem to
a monotone submodular function maximization problem. For a short review of
submodular functions, we refer to Appendix A.
Let M be the set of all independent sets of G and f : 2M → R be a set
function defined as f(S) =
∑
v∈∪I∈SI
w(v). Note that f(∅) = 0 and f is a mono-
tone submodular function. Since we want to find k independent sets I1, . . . , Ik
(for k colors) such that the total weight of vertices covered by them is maxi-
mized, the maximum weight k-colorable subgraph problem is equivalent to the
maximization problem of
maxS⊆M :|S|≤kf(S) . (3)
Note the k independent sets should be disjoint to be a valid coloring, but as
any k independent sets can be modified to be disjoint, the above maximization
problem still gives the same optimal value.
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Algorithm 3 A Greedy Algorithm with Subroutine ALG
1: V ′ = V
2: for i = 1, . . . , k do
3: Run ALG on G(V ′, E) and get an (approx.) max weight independent set Ii
4: V ′ = V ′ \ Ii
5: end for
6: return
⋃
i Ii
The well-known greedy algorithm due to Nemhauser et al. [10], that is Algorithm 3
with the optimal ALG that returns the maximum weight independent set, is a
(1− e−1)-approximation algorithm. However, it is not computationally efficient
as the maximum weight independent set problem is difficult for general graphs;
even the unweighted version is known to be NP-hard and cannot be approxi-
mated in polynomial time within a factor of |V |1−ǫ for any fixed ǫ > 0, unless P
= NP [5].
Instead, we use the following lemma (with its proof in Appendix A) to show
that Algorithm 3 with an approximation algorithm ALG has a similar approxi-
mation guarantee, and design a computationally efficient ALG:
Lemma 1. Algorithm 3 with an α-approximation algorithm ALG is a (1 −
e−1/α)-approximation algorithm for the maximization problem (3).
For the classes of interference graphs in consideration, the following ALG is
a polynomial time approximation algorithm:
ALG := Given graph G, select vertices in decreasing order of weight
as long as those selected form an independent set.
Lemma 2. Algorithm ALG is an α-approximation algorithm for the maximum
weight independent set problem, where α is 2 + γ for interval graphs, (2 + γ)2
for disk graphs, and d for bounded degree-d graphs; and γ = lmax/lmin.
Proof. (Sketch) Note the graphs are bounded claw-free graphs; a graph is (τ+1)-
claw free if each vertex has at most τ mutually non-adjacent vertices. More
generally, ALG is a τ -approximation algorithm on (τ + 1)-claw free graphs. For
each vertex selected by the optimal algorithm, ALG either selects it or does not
select it in favor of another. For each vertex selected by ALG, it can be involved
in at most τ such instances of the latter case. For details, see Appendix B.
Finally, note that Algorithm 3 is equivalent to Algorithm 2; we construct the
independent sets one by one in the former and all at once in parallel in the latter.
By Lemmas 1 and 2, Theorem 1 follows.
4 Network Bandwidth Reallocation
In this section, we show an approximate DA auction for the network bandwidth
reallocation problem. We reduce the problem to the optimization problem of
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 9
Algorithm 4 Greedy Algorithm for the Network Routing Problem
1: T = ∅; N ′ = N ; y(e) = 1/c(e), ∀e ∈ E
2: while N ′ 6= ∅ and
∑
e∈E c(e)y(e) < e¯
C−1m do
3: Si = argminS∈Si
∑
e∈S y(e),∀i ∈ N
′
4: i = argmaxi∈N′
{
v(i)
d(i)·
∑
e∈Si
y(e)
}
5: T = T ∪ {Si}; N
′ = N ′ \ {i}
6: Update y(e) = y(e) ·
(
e¯C−1m
)qSi (e)/(c(e)−1) , ∀e ∈ Si
7: end while
8: return T
network unicast/multicast routing and show a primal-dual greedy algorithm due
to Briest et al. [2] is DA-implementable.
The network bandwidth reallocation problem for unicast routing is defined as
follows: Let G = (V,E) be the network graph with |V | = n, |E| = m, and edge
capacities c(e), ∀e ∈ E. Let N be the firms (the bidders) with access rights such
that each firm i has a terminal pair (si, ti) and demand d(i) and private value
v(i) for his right. Without loss of generality, we assume that d(i) ∈ [0, 1], ∀i;
c(e) ≥ 1, ∀e; and C := minec(e) > 1. Given the reports of firms’ values for their
rights b1, b2, . . ., we buy access rights of some firms such that the demands of
those still retaining rights can be satisfied in the network, i.e., there is a feasible
solution that routes each unsplittable flow of the demanded amount between
terminals subject to the edge capacity constraints. We want to maximize the
social welfare of those still holding rights. Note G is the reduced smaller network
after removing reallocated edges.
In the multicast routing version of the problem, each firm has a set of terminal
vertices, with one being the source, and demands a (unsplittable) multicast tree
(a.k.a., Steiner tree) spanning the terminals.
For the corresponding optimization problem of network routing, we know the
values v(i), ∀i ∈ N and want to compute a subset of firms with the maximum
total value such that their demands can be satisfied. Note that the objectives of
both mechanism design and algorithmic problems are on the same set of firms.
Algorithm 4, due to Briest et al. [2], is a polynomial time greedy algorithm
based on the primal-dual scheme (see Appendix C for the primal-dual linear
programming relaxations). Let Si be the set of all paths from si to ti in G and
S = ⋃i Si; in the multicast routing case, Si is the set of all Steiner trees spanning
the firm i’s terminals. Given S ∈ Si, let qS(e) = d(i) if e ∈ S, and qS(e) = 0
otherwise. Note e¯ ≈ 2.718 is the Euler number. In Line 3, we need to compute
the shortest path with respect to the dual variables y in the unicast routing
case and the minimum weight Steiner tree in the multicast routing case. We can
compute the shortest path exactly using any shortest path algorithm. For the
NP-hard Steiner tree problem, we use the polynomial time 1.55-approximation
algorithm due to Robins and Zelikovsky [11].
We show that Algorithm 4 is DA-implementable and obtain a DA auction
for the network bandwidth reallocation problem:
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Theorem 2. Algorithm 4 is a DA-implementable
(
e¯γC
C−1m
1/(C−1)
)−1
-approximation
algorithm for the network bandwidth reallocation problem where γ = 1 for unicast
routing and γ = 1.55 for multicast routing.
Proof. (DA-implementability) We show an implementation with an active set
and scoring functions as follows: Let the active set A be the set of firms not yet
selected, so N ′ in Algorithm 4, and {yN\Ae }e∈E be the associated dual variables.
We define the scoring functions:
sAi (vi, vN\A) =
v(i)
d(i)
∑
e∈Si
y
N\A
e
, where Si = argminS∈Si
∑
e∈S
yN\Ae . (4)
Note A changes when a firm is selected in Lines 4-5 and the scoring functions
change correspondingly when the dual variables ye change. The scoring functions
are nondecreasing in the first argument and functions of attributes of firms in
N \A. Also, the next firm to be added to N \A is the highest scoring firm.
(Approximation) We refer this part of the proof to Briest et al. [2].
Corollary 2. The DA auction with scoring functions (4) is a
(
e¯γC
C−1m
1/(C−1)
)−1
-
approximate WG-strategy-proof mechanism for the network bandwidth realloca-
tion problem, where γ = 1 for unicast routing and γ = 1.55 for multicast routing.
5 Cost Minimization with Set Cover Constraints
We apply our approach to the cost minimization problem with set cover con-
straints in the selling auction setting.
In the selling auction setting, the DA auction (Algorithm 1) is “inverted”:
the while-loop’s stopping condition becomes ∃i ∈ A : sAi (bi, bN\A) < ∞ (so, it
terminates when all the scores are ∞); the next agent to be rejected in Lines
4-5 becomes the lowest scoring agent argmini∈As
A
i (bi, bN\A); and the payment
rule (1) becomes pi(b−i) = min{b′i ∈ Bi : i ∈ a(b′i, b−i)}. Similarly, each bidder
wants to maximize his utility which is vi − pi(b) if he wins, and 0 otherwise.
In the minimization problems, an auction is α-approximate if it achieves cost
at most 1/α times the optimal cost in all problem instances.
Let N be the set of bidders with cost function c : N → R+ and E be a
universe of elements. For each i ∈ N , there is an associated set Si ⊆ E; we
assume each e ∈ E is covered by, i.e., contained in, at least one Si. For example,
N is a set of firms with private costs c that are bidding b1, b2, . . . to prematurely
terminate their contracts and E is a representation of their responsibilities. We
want to honor requests while rejecting some to ensure that all the responsibilities
are covered by at least one rejected firm. We interpret c(i) to be the value of
early termination for firm i and want to minimize the social cost, the total bid
value, of those still with contracts.
The cost minimization problem with set cover constraints reduces to the
well-known set cover problem with the same objective: given the cost function
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 11
Algorithm 5 Greedy Algorithm for the Set Cover Problem
1: I = ∅; y(e) = 0, ∀e ∈ E
2: while ∃e 6∈
⋃
i∈I Si do
3: Increase y(e) until there is some i such that
∑
e′∈Si
y(e′) = c(i)
4: I = I ∪ {i}
5: end while
6: return I
c, we want to select a subset of N with minimum cost whose sets cover E. The
set cover problem includes many other algorithm design problems such as the
minimum spanning tree problem, the Steiner tree problem, etc.
The set cover problem has primal-dual linear programming relaxations (see
Appendix D) and a polynomial time greedy approximation algorithm, Algorithm 5.
We show that Algorithm 5 is DA-implementable and obtain a DA auction:
Theorem 3. Algorithm 5 is a DA-implementable f−1-approximation algorithm
for the set cover problem where f = maxe|{i : e ∈ Si}|.
Proof. (DA-implementability) We show an implementation with an active set
and scoring functions as follows: Let A be the set of bidders not yet selected
and yN\A(e), ∀e ∈ E be the associated dual variables, dependent on N \ A, in
Algorithm 5. We define the scoring functions as follows:
sAi (ci, cN\A) =
{
c(i)−∑e∈Si yN\A(e), if TN\Ai is not empty
∞, otherwise , (5)
where T
N\A
i = {e : e ∈ Si, e 6∈
⋃
j∈N\A Sj}, i.e., those elements in Si not covered
by the selected sets in N \ A. When a bidder i is selected from A, there is an
element e ∈ TN\Ai , the lowest indexed one if many exist, that we can associate
to the bidder and increase the corresponding dual variable y(e) by the amount
c(i)−∑e′∈Si yN\A(e′).
Note that the scoring functions are nondecreasing in the first argument. As-
sume the lowest scoring bidder it is associated with the element et ∈ TN\Ai at
each iteration t. Then, the steps of the DA auction with the above scoring func-
tions can be realized as the steps of Algorithm 5 when the elements to be used
in Line 3 are exactly the associated elements e1, e2, . . ., and the next bidder to
be selected by Algorithm 5 is the lowest scoring bidder at each iteration.
(Approximation) The proof that Algorithm 5 has the approximation ratio of
f can be found, for instance, in [12].
Corollary 3. The (“inverted”) DA auction with scoring functions (5) is a f−1-
approximate WG-strategy-proof mechanism for the cost minimization problem
with set cover constraints where f = maxe|{i : e ∈ Si}|.
Acknowledgments. We would like to thank Vasilis Gkatzelis, Afshin Nikzad,
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A Submodular Function Maximization
We review the basics of submodular functions and give the proof of Lemma 1 in
Section A.1.
LetM be a finite ground set and f : 2M → R be a set function with f(∅) = 0.
f is submodular if
f(A) + f(B) ≥ f(A ∪B) + f(A ∩B), ∀A,B ⊂M,
or equivalently,
f(A ∪ {i})− f(A) ≥ f(B ∪ {i})− f(B), ∀A ⊂ B, i ∈M.
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Algorithm 6 Greedy Algorithm for the Maximization Prob. (6)
1: S = ∅
2: for j = 1, . . . , k do
3: Let i = argmaxi∈M\S{f(S ∪ {i}) − f(S)}
4: S = S ∪ {i}
5: end for
6: return S
We say that f is monotone if f(A) ≤ f(B) whenever A ⊆ B. To simplify
notations, we define fS(i) to be the marginal value of element i to set S: fS(i) =
f(S∪{i})−f(S). Analogously, let fS(T ) for a set T to be fS(T ) = f(S∪T )−f(S).
Consider the following general maximization problem:
maxS⊆M :|S|≤kf(S) , (6)
where f is a monotone submodular function.
It is well-known that Algorithm 6 due to Nemhauser et al. [10] is a good
approximation algorithm to the above maximization problem:
Theorem 4 (Nemhauser et al. [10]). Algorithm 6 is a (1−e−1)-approximation
algorithm for the maximization problem max|S|≤kf(S) when f : 2
M → R with
f(∅) = 0 is a monotone submodular function.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We prove the following more general statement which subsumes Theorem 4
as a special case. Let an α-approximate oracle in Line 3 of Algorithm 6 be
an algorithm that returns any i ∈ M \ S such that f(S ∪ {i}) − f(S) ≥
1
α ·maxi∈M\S{f(S ∪ {i})− f(S)} :
Lemma 3. Algorithm 6 with an α-approximate oracle in Line 3 is a (1−e−1/α)-
approximation algorithm for any monotone submodular function maximization
problem (6).
Proof. Let ij be the element selected in the j-th iteration and Sj = {i1, . . . , ij},
with S0 = ∅. Let O = {o1, . . . , ok} be the optimal solution.
Claim. For 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1, f(Sj+1)− f(Sj) ≥ 1αk (f(O)− f(Sj)).
Proof. Note that
fSj (O) ≤
∑
o∈O\Sj
fSj (o)
≤ |O \ Sj | ·maxo∈O\SjfSj (o)
≤ k ·maxo∈O\SjfSj (o)
≤ αk · fSj (ij+1)
= αk · (f(Sj+1)− f(Sj)),
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where the first inequality follows from submodularity and the last one from the
α-approximate oracle. Further, we note that fSj(O) = f(Sj ∪ O) − f(Sj) ≥
f(O)− f(Sj) by monotonicity. Putting the two inequalities together, we get the
claim.
Claim. For 1 ≤ j ≤ k, f(O)− f(Sj) ≤
(
1− 1αk
)j
f(O).
Proof. We prove this using induction. The base case is straightforward to check.
For j > 1, note that
f(O)− f(Sj) = f(O)− f(Sj−1)− [f(Sj)− f(Sj−1)]
≤ [f(O)− f(Sj−1)]
(
1− 1
αk
)
.
From the claims, it follows that f(O)−f(Sk) ≤ (1− 1αk )kf(O) ≤ e−1/αf(O).
Equivalently, (1− e−1/α)f(O) ≤ f(Sk).
B Proof of Lemma 2
Note that in the special cases of the unit-interval and unit-disk graphs (i.e.,
γ = 1), we get constant approximations, 3 and 9, respectively. We can further
improve the approximation ratios to 2 and 5 by a more direct packing argument
(e.g., [8] for unit-disk graphs).
Proof. (Interval graphs) For simplicity, we assume vertices (i.e., the intervals) do
not coincide; if two do coincide, then we only keep the one with greater weight.
Let IALG and IOPT be the independent sets returned by ALG and the optimal
algorithm. It is sufficient to consider each v ∈ IOPT that is not in IALG. Note that
v intersects some vertex in IALG, otherwise it would be added to the solution by
the greedy algorithm. Then, there exists v′ ∈ IALG that intersects v such that
w(v′) ≥ w(v). Finally, note that each v′ ∈ IALG can by intersected by at most
2+γ vertices in IOPT. It is sufficient to show that the interval graphs are (2+γ)-
claw free graphs. In the worst case, an interval of length lmax intersects mutually
disjoint intervals of length lmin. Since the intersecting intervals are packed inside
a horizontal range of length 2lmin+ lmax, there can be at most
2lmin+lmax
lmin
= 2+γ
of them.
(Disk graphs) Essentially, the same argument works by noting that the disk
graphs are (2 + γ2)-claw free. In the worst case, a disk of radius lmin intersects
mutually disjoint disks of radius lmin. The smaller disks are contained in a circu-
lar range of radii 2lmin+ lmax around the center of the bigger disk. Hence, there
are at most π·(2lmin+lmax)
2
π·lmin2
= (2 + γ)2 smaller disks.
(Bounded degree-d graphs) A bounded degree-d graph is (d+1)-claw free by
definition, and the argument works directly.
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C LP Relaxations for the Network Routing Problem
The following is the primal-dual linear programming relaxations for the network
unicast/multicast routing problem, stated in Section 4:
maxx
∑
i v(i) ·
(∑
S∈Si
x(S)
)
∑
S:S∈S,e∈S qS(e)x(S) ≤ c(e), ∀e ∈ E∑
S∈Si
x(S) ≤ 1, ∀i
x ≥ 0
miny,z
∑
e c(e)y(e) +
∑
i z(i)
z(i) +
∑
e∈S qS(e)y(e) ≥ v(i), ∀i, S ∈ Si
z, y ≥ 0
D LP Relaxations for the Set Cover Problem
The following is the primal-dual linear programming relaxations for the set cover
problem, stated in Section 5:
minx
∑
i c(i)x(i) maxy
∑
e y(e)∑
i:e∈Si
x(i) ≥ 1, ∀e ∈ E ∑e:e∈Si y(e) ≤ c(i), ∀i ∈ N
x ≥ 0 y ≥ 0
